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Abstract 
Purpose – In this paper, we discuss the phenomenon of knowledge transfer within multinational corporations 
(MNCs), and how the imperatives of thought and action that constitute new knowledge are received in the terrain 
that constitutes the MNC subsidiary. 
Design/Methodology/Approach – This study employs an ethnographic approach, and juxtaposes primary data 
collection with a variety of secondary data sources. 
Findings – We analyze our data in light of the theoretical construct of hegemony, and theorize three themes that 
underlie the process of knowledge transfer.  These include knowledge loss at the local level, the coercive practices 
that ensure knowledge transfer, and the invocation of imperial subjectivities by the headquarters of the MNC when 
dealing with subsidiaries from poorer nations.  
Originality/value – This study goes beyond the mainstream approaches into organizational knowledge transfer, by 
analyzing these issues in light of political economy, and the changing landscape of industrial accumulation.  It offers in 
some measure, the building blocks of a different organizational theory, one that is sensitive to those subjects who are 
consigned to the periphery of mainstream organizing. 
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We do not govern Egypt, we only govern the governors of Egypt 
 Lord Cromer, British Imperial Proconsul, 1885 
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If you took a taxi from Mumbai airport, and traveled due east through some of the most congested 
traffic in the world for around two hours, you would reach the suburb of Malegaon. Malegaon, 
which used to be a village of dairy farmers, has now been claimed by the ever-sweeping sprawl of 
Mumbai, and is now serviced by a two-lane “highway.”  This highway is lined with several 
workshops, where under leaky roofs and oppressively hot interiors, resides a community of some of 
the most skilled machinists in India.  Give them a machine part, and they will replicate it to sub-
millimetric precision.  Give them a machine that manufactures 350 units a minute, and they will 
figure out a way to upgrade its output to 600 units a minute. 
Travel past the makeshift tea stalls, across the perennial puddle in a pothole on the highway, 
and you will enter one of the bigger workshops, which a modest, rusty sign identifies as “Bhavnani 
and Sons.” Once inside, pass a dimly lit corridor, lined by rooms where the din of metal on metal 
drowns out any possible conversation.  Deep within the building is the “office,” a single wooden 
cubicle, with barely enough room for a desk and four chairs.  Stuck on the wall behind the desk, 
amidst old calendars, pictures of Hindu gods and a wall-clock, is a laminated piece of paper.  The 
paper reads… “Our mission is to provide the highest quality and most innovative technological 
solutions to support our customers’ business objectives. Powered by a diverse team of multi-
talented people and technology, we strive to be a customer-driven, results oriented team.”  We are 
looking at the mission statement of Chloroni; a multi-billion dollar US based Multinational 
Corporation (MNC). 
 How does an artifact such as a mission statement physically travel across geographic and 
organizational barriers, and how does it attain legitimacy across dispersed spaces and among 
diverse groups?  What are the processes by which globally scattered organizational beings and 
extra-organizational subjects such as Bhavnani & Sons “learn” to venerate and display this 
artifact? In this paper, we address these questions through a critical analysis of organizational 
approaches to “knowledge transfer” and by reporting the results of an ethnographic study of the 
practices of knowledge transfer in an MNC.  We argue that representations of knowledge 
transfer in organizational studies fail to record the manner in which this process is implicated in 
the historical experiences of power differences and economic imbalances that undergird the 
international encounter.  Despite the explosion of research in the field of knowledge management 
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over the last decade, relatively little attention has been paid to the dynamics of power that shape 
the management of knowledge (Gordon & Grant, 2005).  Our paper is an attempt to fill this gap.   
The rest of this paper is organized in four sections.  In the first, we critically review 
representations of knowledge transfer and organization change in management research.  We then 
present our empirical research, including methodology and theoretical framework.  In the third 
section, we discuss three themes arising from our empirical research, which highlight the 
disjuncture between mainstream theoretical descriptions of knowledge transfer and the empirical 
realities of corporate experience.  In the final section, we use the twin themes of hegemony and 
postcolonial theory to arrive at a different approach to intra-organizational knowledge transfer.   
 
Knowledge and organizational research: a critical assessment 
The construct of “knowledge transfer” continues to attract the curiosity of organizational 
researchers (Inkpen & Pien, 2006).  Whether addressing it the challenge of transferring 
knowledge without compromising its ability to generate value for the firm (Coff, Coff & 
Eastvold, 2006), or engaging in taxonomic analyses of the construct of knowledge for the 
purposes of clarifying transfer-related issues (Lindkvist, 2005), theorists continue to grapple with 
the problem of having no clear understanding of how knowledge successfully negotiates the 
boundaries of spatiality.  One of the biggest challenges for these theorists has been to offer an 
acceptable yet comprehensive definition of the term knowledge.  Knowledge has been variously 
defined as “information whose validity has been established through tests of proof” (Liebeskind, 
1996: 94), as “justified true belief” (Nonaka, 1994: 15), and in several other broad ways.  In one 
of the more comprehensive definitions, Davenport & Prusak (1998: 5) define it thus: 
Knowledge is a fluid mixture of framed experience, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and 
incorporating new experiences and information.  It originates and is applied in the 
minds of knowers.  In organizations, it often becomes imbedded not only in 
documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, 
and norms.   
 
 From this definition, a number of issues are immediately discernible.  First, knowledge 
has a dynamic, fluid character.  Organizational knowledge is seen as advocating certain styles of 
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learning for the organizational subject, which are different from the traditional learning 
mechanisms that are associated with less complex tasks.  This distinction is analogous to the 
difference between “know-that” and “know-how” (Ryle, 1949).  Knowing how to do something 
is not the same as knowing something.  Ryle gives the example of chess: knowing the rules of 
chess does not tell one how to play chess.  The individual learns how to play by practice.  
However, know-how and know-that are not discrete forms of knowledge but are interdependent 
where know-how is “the particular ability to put know-what into practice” (Brown & Duguid, 
1998).  In the context of knowledge flow or knowledge transfer, know-how becomes more 
important than know-that.   
Second, it is also evident from the definition that knowledge is produced in individual 
minds.  Consequently, much of the challenge of knowledge management has been to create 
processes whereby this individual knowledge is transformed into social knowledge (or 
appropriable corporate knowledge).  The discourse of knowledge creation is often is framed in 
terms of “value,” or its ability to deliver rent for the organization.  How individuals gain 
knowledge also reflects the social and cultural context of the learning process.  It confers 
organizational identity upon workers, and is the basis for an organizational culture and tradition.  
But it is important to realize that a common organizational culture is by no means homogenous – 
a CEO of a multinational corporation may have less in common with a clerical assistant in the 
same company as compared to what both organizational members have in common with peers in 
other firms.  Apart from organizational cultural forces there are external forces and social 
networks that influence identity formation and in the process “resisting and refracting for each 
individual the pressures towards uniformity coming from the organization as a cultural force” 
(Brown & Duguid, 2001: 201).                 
 Third, knowledge can provide value only if it is communicable across the organization.  
This communicability across geographic boundaries is predicated upon its codifiability, and its 
routinization, or at least an understanding of which elements can be codified and routinized and 
which of them cannot.  It has been argued that firms exist primarily because they are able to transfer 
knowledge within their boundaries (Kogut & Zander, 1996).  However, there is not much research 
that explores the complexities of knowledge transfer, especially the “dispersedness” or distributed 
nature of knowledge (Becker, 2001).  The dispersedness of knowledge is identified as a significant 
economic problem because the division of labor is normally accompanied by a corresponding 
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division of knowledge (Hayek, 1945; Tsoukas, 1996).  One consequence of this is acknowledging 
the limits to the centralization of knowledge; it is simply not possible to collect all dispersed 
knowledge and manage it to achieve some organizational goal (Hayek, 1988).  Applied to MNCs, 
the process of knowledge transfer across geo-political boundaries becomes even more complex.  
Our attempt in this paper is to problematize conventional theories of knowledge by drawing 
attention to the power-laden and coercive character of knowledge transfer within an MNC.    
 
“Communities of practice” 
In an attempt to provide an integrative perspective of knowledge, Brown and Duguid (2001) suggest 
that “communities of practice” represent more appropriate units of analysis to understand 
knowledge in an organization, with a stronger focus on the implications of practice.  The rationale 
for a focus on practice is its ability to highlight “epistemic differences” between communities of 
practice while overcoming the limitation of conventional theories of knowledge that tend to 
privilege knowledge industries and knowledge workers.  Understanding that knowledge 
management practices are socially and culturally embedded might provide a richer picture of the 
knowledge management process than a functionalist explanation of the inherent properties of 
knowledge (Weick & Westley, 1996).  Focusing on practice also highlights how external cultural 
forces operate in the interaction between an individual and the organization.  As Brown and Duguid 
(2001) point out, cultural forces that influence practice are not necessarily determined by 
organizational leaders or members but arise through the engagement of an individual with his or her 
work practice in the organization.  Knowledge and identity in a practice focused analysis “reflect the 
organization’s de facto division of labor more than its espoused autonomous interests (and self-
interest) of its members” (Brown & Duguid, 2001: 202).   
However, the term “communities of practice,” despite its normatively desirable connotation, 
can often be coercive, political and exploitative.  As Contu and Willmott (2003) point out, even 
cultural accounts of organizational learning that depart from cognitive theories of knowledge and 
focus instead on communities of practice do not explicitly acknowledge relations of power that 
operate in these communities.  Conflicting values and ideologies are elided or represented as 
“pathological” as are historical and social power relations that constitute these communities. 
 
Organizational change 
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Another perspective that dominates theoretical analyses of knowledge transfer is based on the 
construct of “change.”  According to Gordon and Grant (2005), discourses of information 
technology and knowledge management have been influential in “shaping the direction of 
contemporary organizational change.”  Intra-organizational knowledge transfer between a 
multinational corporation and its subsidiaries results in changes in organizational processes in 
both entities, but perhaps more significantly in subsidiary firms.  Knowledge transfer can thus be 
theorized as an example of organization change.  Traditional approaches to organization change 
have viewed the change processes from the perspective of organizational stability rather than 
change as an ongoing process (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  Change is seen as a top down, episodic 
process with a majority of the research providing accounts of change as a fait accompli, 
developing approaches and typologies of change, and discussing its antecedents and 
consequences (Porras & Silvers, 1991; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Van de 
Ven & Poole 1995).  Alternate views of organizational change attempt to shift the focus from the 
organization as a unit, change as an intervention and senior management as change agents to a 
more dynamic approach that focuses on “changing” (as opposed to change) “grounded in the 
ongoing practices of organizational actors” with the “everyday contingencies, breakdowns, 
exceptions, opportunities, and unintended consequences that they encounter” (Orlikowski, 1996: 
65).  “Change” rather than “organization” becomes the ontological focus of this perspective.     
 Some researchers are critical at this reversal of the ontological condition and argue that 
discourses of organizational change management not only tend to endorse “change as an abstract 
ideal but are also highly restrictive about what sorts of change should be pursued” (Sturdy & 
Grey, 2003: 652).  Sturdy & Grey (2003) point out that much of the literature on organizational 
change exhibits a “pro-change” bias that assumes that all transformations are desirable and can 
and should be managed, an assumption whose logical outcome is that any resistance to change is 
deemed “irrational.”  They also critique contemporary discourses of organizational change as 
being rooted in managerial ideology (which is hardly a surprise) but more problematically as 
being a universalizing discourse that pays little attention to the broader social, political, 
economic and cultural arena in which change occurs.  A critical approach to studying 
organizational change would focus on the discursive nature of change processes where language, 
ideas, texts and practices in organizations are all part of the “hegemonic struggles over meaning” 
(Study & Grey, 2003: 659).  In our empirical study we will try to show how structural and 
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discursive struggles play out in the knowledge transfer process between a multinational and its 
subsidiary.  Rather than focus on analyzing discourses as textual or linguistic schemes that 
organizational actors use to make sense of change, we want to examine the conditions where 
discourse becomes hegemonic. 
 
Power and hegemony 
It is the hegemonic characteristic of some change processes that is of particular interest to us in 
the context of knowledge transfer between a multinational and its subsidiaries.  Our empirical 
investigation of the knowledge transfer process is informed by Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.  
For Gramsci (1971), hegemony is a process that sustains the privileged status of dominant 
groups.  Domination occurs through institutional structures, coercion, persuasion, manufacturing 
consent and reliance on coalitions.  The power to dominate takes different forms: institutional 
power and authority of states and multistate institutions, material power resulting from economic 
dominance, and the promotion of an ideological “common sense” that privileges the dominant 
order (Williams, 1976).  Establishing hegemony requires an alignment of institutional, economic 
and organizational forces whose outcome is the universalization of the interests of dominant 
groups (Levy & Sculley, 2006).     
 Conceptualizing power solely in instrumental terms, for example by coercion and 
authoritarian structures, has been critiqued as being too focused on behavioral processes that do 
not make visible systemic processes of power (Lukes, 2005).  Lukes attempts to broaden the 
focus of power in his concept of the “third dimension of power,” which he defines as a “capacity 
to secure compliance to domination through the shaping of beliefs and desires by imposing 
internal constraints under historically changing circumstances” (Lukes, 2005: 144).  Consent is 
secured through the imposition of a dominant ideology.  However, the notion of “willing 
subjects” is problematic because it disallows agency to dominated groups while ceding control to 
powerful elites.  In this concept of power-as-entity there are elements of normative idealism, 
whether the ideal is rationality, truth, justice or democracy (Gordon & Grant, 2005).  It also 
assumes that dominated groups are either unaware that their “real interests” are not being served 
or consent to domination strategically for reasons of survival.   
 The problem with this kind of normative idealism is that it assumes that notions of 
rationality exist independently – as Flyvbjerg (1998: 227) argues rationality is “penetrated by 
 8 
power and it becomes meaningless or misleading – for politicians, administrators and researchers 
alike, to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent.  Power determines what 
counts as knowledge, what kind of interpretation attains authority as the dominant 
interpretation.”  For Flyvbjerg, rationalities are contingent, plural, discursive and outcomes of 
power relations.  In a particular context of power relations between social actors, people present 
their interests as being “rational” for the “community” or the “organization” while eliding the 
power relations that produced that particular rationality.  Thus, in organizations the “effects of 
power (the production of truth and knowledge) depend upon the relationship between the 
practical consciousness of people and the discursive consciousness that various discourses 
proffer” (Gordon & Grant, 2005: 9).  Some interesting questions arise from this concept of 
rationality: what is the rationalization process when a new knowledge management system is 
introduced in an organization?  What are the rationalization strategies that support or oppose the 
changes?  How do they influence agency and power structures? How do they reinforce or 
weaken “existing regimes of domination” (Gordon & Grant, 2005)?  These are some of the 
themes we explore in our empirical analysis of knowledge transfer between a MC and its 
subsidiary.        
 We argue that in the context of power and hegemony there are certain linkages between 
the global political economy at the macro level and the development of knowledge-based 
theories at the organizational level.  As Thompson et al. (2001: 928) point out; theories of 
knowledge management involve codifying and abstracting knowledge from workers thus 
enabling a rationalization of work that “functions as a source of legitimacy and power for 
managers.”  There are several elements of the power relationships between nation states that 
underlie this knowledge flow.  The acceleration of knowledge transfer across national boundaries 
is directly related to the exercise of power on “recipient” nation states by those countries whose 
corporations constitute the sourcing of foreign direct investment (Keren & Ofer, 2002), and are 
mediated through international regimes such as the WTO (Mir, 2001).  However theories of 
knowledge transfer within organizations rarely acknowledge these macro economic and political 
factors.  We will theoretically revisit the concept of hegemony in our discussion section.   
In the next section, we present our research study, which sought to examine the actual 
transfer of knowledge across national boundaries within an MNC.   
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Empirical explorations 
Our fundamental research question is:  How is knowledge transferred across international 
boundaries within a multinational corporation?  Given that this question related to the study of 
organizational processes, we chose a research design that was field-based (van Maanen, 1981).  
Also, given the international dimension (and the inductive character) of our research questions, 
we felt it would be empirically appropriate to locate the research within a single MNC, where we 
would be granted access not only to the corporate headquarters, but also to a specific national 
subsidiary.  Our research plan involved a longitudinal element, in that we wanted to follow a set 
of organizational processes at various stages of organizational life (Van de ven & Poole, 2002).  
We decided to use ethnographic techniques to achieve this objective.  The lead author spent a 
total of 12 months at the foreign subsidiaries of two large US-based MNCs (results from one 
corporation are reported in this paper).  We supplemented the primary data that was collected 
with a variety of other forms of primary and secondary data, and analyzed them using 
conceptually ordered displays and thematic pooling.  In the rest of this section we discuss our 
choice of ethnography as a research method, the organization where research was conducted, and 
our techniques of data collection and analysis. 
 
The Ethnographic Method 
Of the various qualitative research methods employed by social scientists, ethnography has 
developed perhaps the greatest legitimacy (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  Given the rigorous 
demands made on the researcher by the ethnographic process and the interesting and influential 
stories that have been woven over the last century by ethnographers, it has not only become “the 
trademark of cultural anthropology” (Schwartzman, 1993:1), but has also informed a variety of 
social sciences, including organizational studies.  Gideon Kunda’s study (1992) of high tech 
firms and Steven Barley’s (1996) analysis of the work of technicians and technology stand out 
among several ethnographic studies in management.  As Prasad (2005: 78-83) elaborates, the 
great advantage of ethnographic research comes from three sources, namely the ability to 
illuminate a setting in its cultural and historical context (Bate, 1997); the power to provide a 
thick description of events (Geertz, 2000) and the narrative dimension that allows us to string 
different events into coherent thematics (Rosen, 1991).   
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There is another, more compelling reason which guided our choice of ethnography as a 
research method, which related to the power of this methodology to illuminate phenomena that 
dominant discourses consign to the periphery.  In effect, ethnography allowed us to document the 
subtler responses to the imposition of hegemony by dominant groups by a variety of subjects.  In 
effect, the aim of our research was not to provide an authoritative narrative account of the goings 
on at the site of our study. Rather, it was to provide an alternative narrative of the same 
phenomena that had been studied by mainstream organizational theorists.  As the historian 
Sudipta Kaviraj (1992: 38) remarked with respect to subaltern historiography, “the interstices of 
every narrative are filled with semblances rather than truth.  Thus, the telling of true stories in 
history would not rule out the telling of other stories different from the first, which are also true.”  
Our research then, provides an account that is as authoritative as the mainstream accounts of 
knowledge transfer in MNCs.  Indeed, to the extent that the mainstream stories purport to be an 
account of the “reality” of knowledge transfer, we believe that our research provides an 
important counter-narrative.  Alternative stories are a way of restoring the balance, and 
remaining true to what Gadamer (1975: 267-74) has referred to as “the principle of effective 
history.” 
 
Research location 
In line with our research needs, we were able to gain access to a large, US-based MNC, which 
we have nicknamed Chloron Corporation.  Chloron is a world leader in the chemical industry, 
with operations in several different countries.  We were offered access to its subsidiary in India, 
which had been in operation for over 50 years, and employed over 1000 full-time personnel. 
Chloron-India was now a fully owned subsidiary of the parent corporation; a relatively 
recent development.  A discussion of the context in which it became a fully owned subsidiary is 
important.  Given the prevailing political and legal conditions in India in the past, only 39% of 
Chloron-India had been owned by the parent organization till 1995, and it operated as a “stand-
alone” business until 1995.   This was primarily because India’s Foreign Exchange Regulations 
Act (FERA) had stipulated various constraints on the investment of foreign exchange in the 
country; one of which had been that no foreign entity could hold more than 40% stake in its 
Indian subsidiary.  The rest of the equity had to be drawn from local investors.  As a 
consequence, Chloron had relied on a variety of Indian entrepreneurs to provide the other 60%.  
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Thus, the transformation of Chloron-India from a stand-alone corporation to a subsidiary was 
itself an artifact of globalization. 
Beginning in 1991, the Indian government began an extensive project of liberalization, 
which, among other things, led to the relaxation of FERA (Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, 2002), 
making it possible for corporations like Chloron to increase their stake in their Indian operations.  
By 1995, Chloron had bought up all the available equity in its Indian operations, turning Chloron 
into wholly owned subsidiary.  The corporation then began an extensive reorganization process, 
where the financial data reporting, market intelligence, accounting systems, and other reporting 
patterns of the subsidiary were restructured to mirror the corporate structure.  Our research at 
Chloron-India coincided with a transition period, where the globalization of the subsidiary was 
underway, but incomplete.   
Chloron-India had annual revenues of around $50m, which was very small by the 
standards of its other national subsidiaries, but was growing at a rate of around 25% per annum, 
which was high by Chloron’s global standards.  It employed around 1000 fulltime workers at its 
plants, offices and the sales force, with a well developed manufacturing and distribution 
infrastructure, as well as a network of outsourced manufacturing and sales contractors. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
We collected data from a variety of primary and secondary sources.  Primary data collection 
included participant observation and interviews.  Secondary sources included confidential 
corporate correspondence, firewall-protected intranet sites and other proprietary sources within 
the corporation (the entire data in this study has been re-checked to eliminate any possible breach 
of confidentiality).  This data was also supplemented by publicly available information such as 
corporate annual reports, macro economic data and industry analysis reports. 
 Participant observation was conducted over three stints, which lasted a total of 12 
months, spread over 3 years.  These included attending a variety of meetings, from routine 
planning meetings to strategy sessions; visits to manufacturing sites, distributors and 
accompanying sales personnel on calls; time spent at contractor premises; and extensive 
interactions with the MIS and IT departments.  Interviews were conducted with a variety of 
actors such as the head of the subsidiary, visiting executives from the US-based headquarters, 
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middle and lower managers, non-managerial staff such as technicians and sales people, contract 
workers and external informants such as economists and trade union activists. 
 Data analysis involved an extensive regimen of transcription, coding, and the use of 
concept cards (Martin & Turner, 1986) and conceptually ordered displays (Miles & Huberman, 
1994: 127).  Data were coded and logged according to thematic consistency (Madison, 2005: 36-
39).  The various themes were placed in a framework, which can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
 As Figure 1 shows, knowledge transfer can be studied at multiple levels, including the 
nation of the subsidiary, the nation of the headquarters, the headquarters of a multinational 
corporation, the subsidiary of a corporation, and the international regimes (such the World Trade 
Organization) all of whom interact in the process of knowledge transfer.  The headquarters of the 
organization is primarily concerned with issues of the protection of intellectual property rights as 
well as maximizing revenue appropriation, while the subsidiary is interested in being integrated in 
the global space in such a manner that its voice is dialogically heard, and its independence is not 
compromised.  The country that exists at the subaltern level of this transaction is focused on the 
maintenance of its national identity and sovereignty, but at the same time, is eager to get the benefits 
of global investment.  The country of the corporation’s headquarters is also concerned with 
developing favorable trade terms, and has the task of balancing the potential opportunities afforded 
by internationalization against attendant economic and political risks.  Finally, international regimes 
deal with transnational concerns such as the securing of intellectual property rights, solving 
multilevel disputes, and the management of tax and tariffs.  For example, the WTO is focused on 
developing platforms for multilateral discussions between corporations and countries, on issues as 
wide ranging as patent protection, tariff reduction and currency convertibility.  In the space 
characterized by episodes of organizational knowledge transfer, international regimes often function 
more as agents of the dispersed corporation.  Each entity approaches the issue of knowledge transfer 
with different areas of focus, but the challenge for the theorist is to develop a framework that uses 
the knowledge transfer transaction as a unit of analysis, but is still sensitive to the enactment of all 
the compulsions and focus areas. 
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Enterprise requirement planning:  a story of knowledge transfer 
It is extremely frustrating.  Here is a perfectly serviceable UNIX system, which we 
have to dismantle and install this @#$%X* AS400 system.  I could accept it if we 
were going to put in a much better system, like SAP or PeopleSoft’s ERP.  But now, 
in this day and age, we have to learn to use mainframes, when Springfieldii itself has 
declared that it will phase out the AS400 by 2003.  Our UNIX system is similar in 
architecture to the new system they have planned for the organization.  So we are 
working to put ourselves back from 2000 to 1985!  By the time we learn AS400 
operations; we would have lost all our knowledge of distributed computing, and will 
have to go back with a begging bowl to Springfield, asking them to train us in 
networking and ERP. 
Vijay Tendulkar, GM, Information Technology, Chloron-India 
 
 In this paper, we have chosen to analyze a specific episode of knowledge transfer from 
the US headquarters of Chloron to Chloron-India, which was located in the IT department.  It 
involves the installation of an Enterprise Requirement Planning (ERP) system at the Indian 
subsidiary, which was driven by the headquarters.  
First, the story in brief: For a variety of political and contextual reasonsiii, Chloron-India 
had not been able to install Chloron’s corporate ERP system in the 1980s.  Deprived of this 
knowledge, the subsidiary had developed an innovative system based on locally available 
hardware and software, which performed the ERP job adequately, and produced information in a 
format that was compatible with the requirements of the headquarters.  Now that the political 
constraints on hardware import had been lifted, Chloron-India was facing pressure from the 
headquarters to change over to the centralized ERP system, at great capital and learning cost.   
The frustration embodied in the quote by Vijay Tendulkar, the local IT chief, arose from 
one important factor: the ERP system that Chloron-India was expected to install had itself had 
been declared obsolete by the headquarters a year ago.  Now that the IT community was 
migrating from mainframe-based systems to distributed, networked and server-based systems, 
Chloron had embarked upon an ambitious program in the US to overhaul its corporate ERP 
system to a distributed system, albeit in a phased manner.   
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The new system proposed by headquarters for eventual global adoption ironically 
possessed many characteristics that were similar to the ones possessed by the current system at 
Chloron-India.  The Indian system was not dependent on big computers, but a network of smaller 
computers, using distributed data processing protocols.  The local innovations that had been 
made by the Indian subsidiary actually were much more compatible with the corporate system of 
the future, but totally at odds with the corporate system of the present.  However, the corporate 
IT team felt that it would be too long a wait if they let Chloron-India change over directly from 
its current system to the proposed future system, a process that could take three years.  In the 
interim, they decided that Chloron-India should change to the mainframe-based system right 
away.  In effect, the headquarters decision to change the ERP system was pushing Chloron-India 
from the future into the past! 
Tendulkar was particularly bitter because he felt that there were no institutional avenues 
by which he would be able to represent this information to the headquarters.  For one, as a 
“promotee-manager,” with a less-than-stellar educational background and a shaky command 
over English, he had been excluded from many of the interactions that Chloron-India’s top 
managers had with visitors from the headquarters.  For another, his boss Pinchoo Kapoor, the 
CEO of Chloron-India, was known to be more of a “headquarters-man” than a champion of local 
initiative, having been transferred recently to Chloron-India from an overseas assignment as an 
explicit “agent of globalization,” presumably to counter the relatively intransigent stands taken 
against the headquarters by his predecessor.  According to Tendulkar, Kapoor could scarcely 
position himself as an objector to the process: “he makes constant speeches about how we should 
not be ‘resistant to change.’  He has been reprimanding people who do not keep the mission 
statement framed on their office walls.  He is not going to go to Springfield (Chloron’s 
headquarters) and say that we will not follow their orders.” 
Ultimately, as researchers, we were able to document the manner in which the new/older 
ERP system was installed in Chloron-India.  Tendulkar was given the unenviable job of seeing 
this operation through, while simultaneously, S. Padmanabhan, a young MBA from an elite 
business school was appointed to an Asia-Pacific team that was drawing up a blueprint for the 
migration of Chloron’s ERP systems to the distributed model by 2004.  It was a matter of 
common knowledge in the corporation that Padmanabhan was being groomed to succeed 
Tendulkar as the head of IT at Chloron-India.  For purposes of narrative parsimony, we have 
 15 
chosen to present the events surrounding the ERP system installation in the form of a Tendulkar-
Padmanabhan binary, lest the main ideas of the paper be lost in the thickness of ethnographic 
description.  However, this mode of representation should not be taken to assume that either 
Tendulkar or Padmanabhan were the sole champions of their perspective.  There were several 
other players in the process, whose views mirrored either that of Padmanabhan or Tendulkar (or 
other players such as Kapoor).  Nor is the specific event of our story, that of ERP system 
installation, the sole site of contestation around issues of knowledge transfer.  There were several 
areas of contestation between Chloron and Chloron-India where similar knowledge-transfer 
dynamics were visible.  
  Of the many instances of knowledge transfer that we observed at Chloron-India, we have 
chosen to foreground the above incident because it fleshes out the manner in which the process 
of communication between the headquarters and the subsidiary is inflected with authority rather 
than persuasion, of a univocal rather than a dialogical process, and of an absolutist rather than a 
context-sensitive representation of organizational reality.  We found Tendulkar to be almost like 
the figure of Oedipus in the Greek tragedy, whose will was completely subordinate to the 
determinism of circumstances, and who was doomed to participate in his own impending 
annihilation.  Padmanabhan, on the other hand, found the position assumed by the Chloron 
headquarters acceptable, despite its authoritarian streak.  He found it convenient and expedient to 
accept their line lock stock and barrel, because it suited his personal interests, and because in his 
worldview, he was more predisposed to see a global logic to it.  In these personalities and their 
approaches, the entire power dynamics within the organization can be made visible.  This 
approach follows the ethnographic analysis made famous by Clifford Geertz, who analyzed how 
we can understand a number of things about Balinese culture as a whole from representing a 
single event: in his case a cockfight.  For Geertz, the cockfight was not just about the staging of 
an event, but a comment on the hierarchical ordering of Balinese society and how it is enveloped 
in various webs of significance (Geertz, 1973).  Likewise, the contest over an ERP system is 
itself a contest about power, representation and dominance. 
 
Three themes:  an analysis of knowledge transfer at Chloron 
Based on an extensive analysis of the situation, we found that the narratives of Tendulkar and 
Padmanabhan, while analyzing the same event, were “Rashomon-likeiv" in their 
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incommensurability.  For instance, Tendulkar recounted the moment when the idea was first 
proposed to him by Pinchoo Kapoor, the head of Chloron-India.  He maintains that when he 
declared the idea to be incompatible with the strategic goals of Chloron-India: 
…Mr. Kapoor began to get angry with me.  “The problem with you, Tendulkar, is 
that you are afraid of change.  But I am not.  Let me tell you that this is not (the old 
CEO’s) time.  You cannot begin every conversation with a ‘no’ and get away with it! 
If we are to grow in today’s environment, we will have to learn to look at markets in 
terms of regions, and not nations.  We are not an Indian company; we are the Asia-
Pacific subsidiary of a global company.”   
In effect, globalization was being invoked by Kapoor to steer Tendulkar toward a 
decision that was not in local (subsidiary) interests.  Padmanabhan had a similar analysis of the 
situation as Tendulkar, but projected a different perspective, which was a function of his own 
ability to acquiesce to a global demand, and also of his personality one who had an 
understanding of the deterministic nature of a decision made by the headquarters: 
I can say definitely that if I had been the decision-maker, I would never have 
purchased the AS400s (The IT system under dispute).  Between you and me, if I had 
been put on the AS400 team, I would be getting ready to post my biodata (mail my 
resume) to recruiters right now.  If Tendulkar had been given a free hand, we would 
have continued working with the existing older computers and then gone directly to 
networked 256-bit Pentium machines running SAP.  In a way he would be right.  But 
unfortunately, because of the need for global standardization we had to go in for 
these AS400s, and we are not very good at using their system.  New training, new 
hassles, it is all very dirty work.  I am very happy that I was not sidelined into that 
project. Some of my colleagues now have to spend a lot of time getting trained on 
IBM AS400 machines.  I think it is a very big waste of time.  And if I was in their 
place, I would have really resigned and gone to another company.  But I am doing 
very high-quality work here and it is very sad to see that the work they are doing will 
not really be of that much use in 5 to 6 years.  But really, one must be practical.  
What is the point of fighting when corporate people like Mr. Clemente (the corporate 
IT head), our big boss Mr. Kapoor and the Asia-Pacific team, have all made a 
decision?  It shows that Tendulkar does not understand human relations.  He is too 
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much of a technical man.  He should have had an MBA like me, and he would have a 
better understanding of corporate culture. 
 
 Eventually, Chloron-India implemented the system of the headquarters’ choice.  
Tendulkar was forced to dismantle his futuristic IT set-up, and go with the mainframes.  
Ironically, when Chloron put together a global team to evaluate the efficacy of a new ERP 
system for the future, Padmanabhan was made part of this highly visible team.  This was as 
much a recognition of his ability to deal with distributed computing as it was a reward for his 
political role in facilitating the transfer of mainframe technology to India, or rather, his role in 
neutralizing Tendulkar’s objections.  In his own candid words: 
The funny thing is, I think I was put on the SAP team after I had supported the 
AS400 project!  When Mr. Kapoor made it clear to me that we were going to go 
ahead with the project, and that he had agreed to Mr. Clemente’s suggestions, I 
decided to support it.  No point in fighting losing battles like Tendulkar.   
 
 Based on our analysis of this episode, we have identified three themes that we believe 
need to be brought to the attention of those organizational theorists who analyze intra-
organizational knowledge transfer, but pay lesser attention to its power-laden dimensions.  The 
entire process of knowledge transfer at Chloron is of course driven by macro-economic changes.  
The intensification of Chloron’s interest in its subsidiary, the changed ownership structure, and 
the facilitation of the integration of ERP systems through the re-entry of IBM (and the AS 400) 
into India are all artifacts of the triumph of globalization and neoliberal political reform in India 
(Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, 2002), which has radically different effects on the careers of 
Tendulkar and Padmanabhan.   
 
Theme 1: Filling tea into a full cup: uneven knowledge flows and knowledge loss  
Empirical research on knowledge transfer has tended to follow one of two assumptions.  Either 
knowledge is perceived as flowing into a vacuum (Wheelwright & Clark, 1995), or it is depicted 
that knowledge flows play the role of agents of creative destruction, destroying old knowledge 
and replacing it with new (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  However, the 
reality is more complex here.  The system developed at Chloron-India is quite a sophisticated, 
 18 
working system.  In effect, by transferring knowledge into Chloron-India, the US headquarters is 
attempting to “pour tea into a full cup,” to quote a Sufi proverb.  The interesting question is, 
what needs to be emptied for the tea to be placed in the cup?  How can we account for the 
knowledge that Chloron-India will lose from this knowledge-transfer transaction? 
 Tendulkar’s objection to the new system was based on technological grounds: 
Our UNIX-based system may not be state-of-the art, but it is actually much better 
than Springfield’s system, and actually more suitable for future upgrades.  The 
whole world is now going in for networking and there is no need to go back in time 
and get ourselves a mainframe-based data processing system. 
 
 Moreover, it was better suited to the Indian terrain, since it bypassed much of India’s 
unreliable telecommunications infrastructure, and had backup options where stored data could be 
sent across nodes using couriers and CDs in case of sustained telecommunications failure.  The 
new system presupposed uniform connectivity, and would be more vulnerable to such 
breakdowns.  The new system also had the effect of pushing Chloron-India to the back of the line 
in terms of those subsidiaries that would have access to the latest system.  The reasoning at the 
headquarters was, “let us get some work out of these AS 400 systems before we replace them.”   
Unfortunately, the manufacture of AS400 systems had been discontinued by IBM (Chloron-India 
received its stock from inventory), and were a low priority for IBM’s maintenance division as 
well.  Over time, many of the personnel who had expertise in UNIX systems quit Chloron India.  
As Tendulkar said: 
What pains me is that we will soon be in the same boat that we were in the 
early1980s (when Chloron-India had to move from mainframes to distributed 
systems).  The only difference will be that while at that time there was a ‘UNIX 
culture’ in the IT department.  By now, that competency has been eroded.  In 
another year, it will be completely lost.  Several old-timers have left, and the new 
people have worked only on an AS400 platform since their arrival here.  We are 
becoming more and more backward. Linux and Windows XP have become the 
operating systems of choice all across corporate, but we still struggle with the 
AS400.   I sometimes find it amusing.  Mr. Kapoor had been glad to pay the 
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consultants who designed the project $1,000 dollars a day to put this system into 
place.  What he did not realize was that we are still paying for it. 
 
 “Knowledge flow” has been the term of choice used in strategy research to refer to various 
complex transfers of expertise in MNCs (Appleyard, 1996), but we find this to be a troubling 
legacy.  The term “flow” connotes the existence of a gradient, a movement that is natural, and 
involving a substance that is fluid.  The Merriam Webster’s Dictionaryv uses multiple terms to 
describe flow, such as “to move,” “to proceed smoothly and readily,” “to have a smooth 
continuity or “to derive from a source.”  Such descriptions exude a sense of desirability and 
inevitability that scarcely captures the complex, often coercive manner in which subsidiaries of 
MNCs are “modified” according to the exigencies determined by the headquarters.  Research on the 
roles of MNC subsidiaries rarely examines power dynamics that underlie MNC-subsidiary 
relationships.  Instead, the focus is on classifying types of subsidiaries based on those that “exploit 
existing MNC knowledge” and those that “augment existing MNC knowledge” (Almeida & Phene, 
2004).  Our analysis of knowledge transfer at Chloron did not reveal these clear distinctions – 
instead what we found was fragmentation, contestations, coercions, manufactured consent, loss of 
knowledge, and the stifling of local innovation.        
 
Theme 2: Knowledge transfer and coercion 
Global change does not require so much a transfer of knowledge from one part of 
the globe to the other as it does the investment in different types of global dialogues 
that can create new knowledge contextualized in multiple sites.  This requires 
investments in dialogues that can initiate localized creativity and imagination and 
foster newer meanings and texts.   
Bouwen and Steyaert (1999:304-5) 
 The story of the “upgrade” of Chloron-India from UNIX to AS400 offers us some 
important pointers.  On one hand, we have the forces of globalization represented by the US 
headquarters of Chloron, its Singapore unit (which headed the Asia Pacific division and provided 
much of the logistical support for the AS 400 conversion), and partially, Pinchoo Kapoor and 
Padmanabhan, who force their logic on Tendulkar and his team.  The absence of the dialogic 
process in this particular case is important.  The executive team at India is used to apply pressure 
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on Tendulkar.  Kapoor’s angry outburst about Tendulkar needing to go beyond “narrow” frames 
of reference, and subsequent attempts to corral opposition to the SAP project offer evidence of 
this coercion.   
Eventually, Tendulkar suffered sanctions as a consequence of his resistance.  
Interestingly, while he was not fired, his punishment was very ironic and Sisyphean. He was 
forced to oversee the diminishment of his importance by giving him charge of the very process 
that he had opposed.  While at times, Tendulkar’s position seemed to find technological 
justification at the level of the headquarters, the political process won over the logic of 
technological rationality.  We can only speculate about Tendulkar’s assertion that the entire 
project was a case of escalated commitment based on an initial misreading of the complexity of 
Chloron-India’s indigenous system by the headquarters, but it does seem quite clear that the 
process ran roughshod over local objections.  While this could be seen as an example of 
authoritative power we believe the reality is more complex.  Local objections were overcome by 
creating compliance with key actors in the subsidiary.  While the process of creating compliance 
included elements of Lukes’ third dimension of power where beliefs are shaped through the 
“imposition of internal constraints under historically changing circumstances,” we believe the 
discursive power of “historically changing circumstances” produced certain material effects that 
are not taken into account by current theories about power and knowledge transfer.   
This theme can also be seen as a clear challenge to the benign representations of 
“communities of practice” that populate the literature on organizational learning and knowledge 
management.  While Chloron-India’s IT advisory team, dispersed between Mumbai, Singapore 
and Springfield, can be seen as a “community,” the contestations within this communal space are 
not solved by dialogue, but eventually by fiat and order.  In traditionalist representations of such 
communities, Tendulkar comes across as a recalcitrant resistor, who is eventually won over by 
the community (after all, he eventually participated in the IT changeover).  However, the reality 
is that Tendulkar’s opinion had no currency in the organizational schema to start with.  It is this 
pre-ordained fate of his perspective that ultimately challenges the representation of 
organizational spaces as communities of practice, and refocuses attention on the dynamics of 
coercive practices. 
 
Theme 3: (Post)colonial subjectivities  
 21 
If we are to grow in today’s environment, we will have to learn to look at markets 
in terms of regions, and not nations.  We are not an Indian company; we are the 
Asia-Pacific subsidiary of a global company. 
Pinchoo Kapoor 
 
We worked hard on the project. It is still a bit shaky, but in the beginning, it was 
worse.  I remember how we used to work day and night.  Even now, you were 
yourself here, and saw how all of us came even on Deepavalivi.  I had asked Mr. 
Clemente if I could give my staff the day off on Deepavali.  It is after all, a 
national holiday here, and everybody has religious functions at home.  But he 
said, “Our deadline here will be affected if you do not meet yours.”  So we all 
came.  Of course, when they have their (Thanksgiving) holidays, we are 
automatically shut down.  We give thanks when corporate is thankful.  Otherwise, 
our Deepavali remains thankless. 
Om Shivpuri (Tendulkar’s Deputy) 
 
 The above two statements foreground an important schism within Chloron-India.  
Pinchoo Kapoor, the CEO of Chloron-India, is exhibiting a sophisticated familiarity with the 
reality of globalization, while Om Shivpuri is bitterly opposing a work schedule that keeps him 
in office in early November on Deepavali (India’s equivalent of Christmas), while offering him a 
holiday in late November because the headquarters is closed for Thanksgiving.   
Kapoor was indeed an urbane man.  Educated in the prestigious Indian Institute of 
Management at Calcutta, he had spent two decades in the management cadre of Chloron.  He had 
been rotated across several management functions and geographies, and his last stint was as the 
head of consumer marketing in Malaysia.  He was an authority on teak furniture, and could speak 
informedly of the relative merits of French impressionist paintings and the Bengal school of 
paintings in India. And indeed, his statement could be incorporated seamlessly into such books 
on global corporations such as Kenichi Ohmae’s The Borderless World.   
The manufacture of consent in this particular knowledge transfer process was enabled by 
a discursive process that created specific subjectivities and spaces of common interest between 
actors in the headquarters and the subsidiary.  We argue that colonial and development 
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discourses played a role in creating the conditions where consent was manufactured.  
Postcolonial theorists have reflected upon the emergence of the global subject among the third-
world elite. From their perspective, we could make a linkage between Kapoor and a quote made 
by Lord Thomas Macaulay over 200 years ago.  Speaking in his capacity as the Legal Member of 
the Council of Indian Education in 1785, Macaulay (Macaulay, 1782, 1972: 249) stressed,  
“We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us 
and the millions we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but 
English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.  To that class, we may leave 
it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms 
of science borrowed from the western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees 
fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of population.” 
   
Kapoor certainly fits the bill as one of the “interpreters” in Macaulay’s schema.  
Likewise, Padmanabhan was rewarded for his compliance, despite his off-the-record reservations 
about the new system.  In Padmanabhan’s analysis of the situation, we can see the empirical 
representation of a corporate reality that the current theories of knowledge transfer are very well 
suited to describe.  Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) discuss how “corporate socialization of 
subsidiary managers” enable the alignment of subsidiary managers “values and norms” with that 
of the parent organization.  This process was apparent in Chloron with Kapoor and 
Padmanabhan: we have the consultant, the international team, the perils of standardization, the 
limits of absorptive capacity and infrastructure, cultural exchanges and a future focus.  However, 
it is Tendulkar’s (and Shivpuri’s) story that is ultimately banished to the shadows of theory; the 
exercise of power, the loss of a valuable fund of local knowledge, and a subtle process of 
deskilling that is not even explored by labor process theorists.  Shivpuri, on the other hand, was 
articulating his anger with Chloron in extremely local terms.  For him, the peril of Chloron was 
that it devalued his local identity, which was expressed in this case as a religious affiliation.  
Thus Chloron’s claim of being global rang hollow with him not just because he had to work on 
Deepavali, but also because of the Thanksgiving holiday he had to “endure.”  It appears that 
Kapoor, the global, postnational subject and Tendulkar, the local, national subject exist in uneasy 
proximity in Chloron-India.  Globalization within Chloron, and indeed in all MNCs, is an 
extremely unfinished vision. 
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Discussion:  knowledge transfer and hegemony 
In the last section we identified three themes that we contend are ill-analyzed in organization 
theory’s exploration of knowledge transfer.  How can we make comprehensive theoretical sense of 
knowledge-loss on the name of knowledge transfer, institutionalized coercion of headquarters by 
subsidiaries, the social schisms within organizations created by this process, and the reflection of 
macro realities within the organizational domain?  As we had discussed in the pre-empirical section 
we believe that these themes can be put together using the theme of “hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971; 
Guha, 1989; Williams, 1977).   
 The important role played by international regimes like the WTO in re-orienting the 
relationship between India and the US, Chloron and Chloron-India and Chloron and Bhavnani 
lies in their ability to set the terms of a dialogue, to which all parties, however unwillingly 
become a party.    Likewise, the relationship between Chloron and Chloron-India follows a 
familiar trajectory.  Modern complex organizations like Chloron are structured into hierarchies 
that create dominant and subordinate groups within the organization.  The function of managerial 
practice is to exert control over the actions of the organizational subjects through the exercise of 
sanctioned power and dominance.  This dominance is brought to bear through a combination of 
coercion and persuasion.  Coercion refers to those managerial techniques that rely largely upon 
overt supervision, surveillance, and discipline.  Persuasion, on the other hand, solicits the willful 
participation of its subjects.   
The analytical category of hegemony both includes and goes beyond the concept of 
ideology by pointing out that certain forms of dominance use persuasion over coercion in order 
to seek the active consent of the subordinate groups.  This perspective allows us to understand 
that knowledge transfer can be better distinguished as a package of constitutive and constituting 
meanings, cultures and practices, which includes concessions by the headquarters that go beyond 
its own narrow and immediate interests.   
The hegemonic project that undergirds knowledge transfer at Chloron does not dismantle 
the leadership of the dominant groups such as the managers at Springfield.  However, it does 
manage to create a web of social relations, ideas and practices wherein some of the demands of 
the subsidiary (as articulated by Tendulkar’s stubbornness) are met in the pursuit of a particular 
social order.  While this order is maintained predominantly through persuasion, the headquarters 
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do not (and indeed, cannot) abandon their coercive apparatus.  As Guha (1989) maintains, while 
steering us clear of this liberal-utopian conceptualization, hegemony is a particular condition of 
dominance where persuasion momentarily outweighs coercion.  The concept of “normative 
control” (Kunda, 1992) also appears to operate at Chloron, albeit with differing consequences for 
Tendulkar and Padmanabhan.  As Kunda (1992: 11) argues, normative control is an attempt to 
direct the required efforts of members “by controlling the underlying experience, thoughts, and 
feeling that guide their action.  Under normative control members act in the best interest of the 
company not because they are physically coerced, nor purely from an instrumental concern with 
economic rewards and sanction.”  Rather it is the particular type of subjectivities created that 
produce “internal commitment” and “strong identification with company goals” among 
employees.  Both control and coordination are goals of MNCs that configure their relationship 
with subsidiaries.  As Alvesson and Kärreman (2001: 1006) point out, these two modes of 
managerial intervention are enacted through social and technostructural mediums of interaction.  
At the social level MNCs attempt to exercise normative control (“prescribed interpretations”) 
over their subsidiaries by persuading its employees to develop and sustain a distinct corporate 
identity (for example, Chloron’s mission statement, which is not only displayed by employees, 
but is informally mandated for display by subaltern outsiders like Bhavnani and Sons).  At the 
technostructural level knowledge management becomes “enacted blueprints” or “templates for 
action” (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001).  This can occur through codification using information 
technology or personalization through normative control.  At both levels of social and 
technostructural, the aim is to increase the efficiencies involved in transforming inputs to 
outputs.  However, as Alvesson and Kärreman (2001) argue, this often results in a loss of 
knowledge rather than a gain because of the reduced complexities, nuances and subtleties that 
are necessary for these efficiencies to occur.  Thus, “the technocratic and socio-ideological types 
of management are predisposed to operate in a way that eliminates and substitutes knowledge, 
rather than maintaining and creating it” (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001: 1013). 
 Subsidiary responses to the regimes of empowerment therefore take forms that are 
subtler, even dialogical.  Resistance to work practices often takes on a more passive, “routine” 
dimension (Scott, 1985).  Open confrontations are reduced, and replaced by “subtle 
subversions,” by acts of “disengagement,” and “ambiguous accommodations” (Prasad & Prasad, 
2002).   For instance, instead of more confrontational practices such as work-to-rule, workers 
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feign incompetence in carefully chosen arenas, thereby subverting organizational plans for a 
flexible workforce (Gottfried, 1994).  For example, the invocation of the Deepavali festival by 
the workers under Tendulkar sent a signal to the headquarters that while they would have their 
way, the disempowered employees at Mumbai neither appreciated having to work on their 
festival nor did they enjoy their day off for the US Thanksgiving.  The headquarters had its way, 
but lost some of its legitimacy in the bargain. 
A number of researchers have documented this phenomenon of how, in responding to 
large-scale organizational changes such as computerization (Prasad, 1992) or re-engineering 
(Diplock, 1997), workers periodically alter their level of enthusiasm for the process as a means 
of communicating their fears and expectations.  Sometimes, workers in modern organizational 
settings may play out their resistance through the invocation of ghosts, spirits, legends and 
religious deities (Ong, 1987).  They may choose to accentuate their separateness from the 
managerial class by refusing to accept organizational gifts, thereby ceremonially disputing the 
managerial posturing that there is more to the manager-worker relationship than a pact between 
wage and labor (Kondo, 1990).  The everyday relations at the workplace are the sites of class 
struggle, of alienation, of the constitution of worker subjectivity, of the gendering of work and its 
subversion, of intra-organizational bargaining, and sometimes, of relations of imperialism and 
cultural dislocation.  In several instances at Chloron, we encountered specific acts of resistance 
that were aimed primarily in this direction – in that a number of employees as well as related 
groups such as contractors and ‘partners’ at the subsidiary level engaged in acts that were of 
minor consequence to the corporation, but were aimed at decentering the legitimacy of the 
headquarters in some small fashion. 
 There is also a colonial dimension to hegemonic practice.  Insights from postcolonial 
theory allow us to understand how a “global subject” is produced in the former colonies.  As 
several theorists have pointed out the history of development in the Third World is also a history 
of colonialism (Escobar, 1995; Harvey, 1996).  Traces of colonialism in present “postcolonial” 
histories of new nation states are often obliterated or retraced in economic terms of  “progress” 
and “development” without speaking of its complicity in contemporary power relations (Shohat, 
1992).  There are very few studies of how colonial modes of development impact organizations 
in developing economies.  A few researchers have examined the types of colonial discourses that 
inform organization-stakeholder relationships (Banerjee, 2000), organizational control (Mir et 
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al., 2003), organizational culture (Cooke, 2003); workplace resistance (Prasad & Prasad 2003) 
and cross cultural studies in management (Kwek, 2003).  In terms of its use in our discipline 
postcolonial theory can serve as a powerful foil to subvert the “objective,” “scientific” claims 
that privilege Western forms of knowing.  Critical management scholars have focused on the 
emancipatory possibilities of defamiliarization in developing a new understanding of the 
received knowledge in any field in terms of subject positions created by an explicit 
acknowledgment  of the epistemological and ontological assumptions of that knowledge.  As 
Prasad (2003) points out, a postcolonial perspective can be productive in the sense that it can 
reveal the neo-colonial assumptions that underlie management disciplines, especially in the field 
of international management and cross cultural management.  Neocolonialism can be understood 
as a continuation of Western colonialism without the traditional mechanism of expanding 
frontiers and territorial control but with elements of political, economic and cultural control.  
Such a perspective will allow us to enrich theories of knowledge management where the current 
preoccupation about knowledge flow patterns and corporate control over subsidiaries does not 
consider the broader cultural, political and economic environments that allow MNCS to 
“control” their subsidiaries (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991).  
 
Conclusion 
It is important to reiterate that this study should under no circumstances be seen as a repudiation 
of the existing theories of knowledge transfer.  Within corporations, the act of transferring 
expertise across divisions and geographies is often expedient and effective.  Subsidiaries of 
corporations typically lobby the headquarters to intensify the transfer process, and to be 
recipients of new knowledge (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991).  However, even while 
acknowledging this reality, this study seeks to highlight those elements of the process that have 
been curiously effaced by the generally accepted theories of knowledge transfer.  First, for a 
variety of organizational subjects, the process is often inflected with coercion, and is devoid of 
dialogue.  Second, the headquarters of the MNC attempt to render its perspective hegemonic, and 
passive resistance by the subsidiary continually subverts their attempt to achieve complete 
legitimacy.  The complete absence of any discussion of these elements in theories, accounts and 
empirical research studies of knowledge transfer also says much about the isomorphism that 
characterizes organizational theory. 
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It should be obvious that our own reading of knowledge transfer is not celebratory.  We 
do not believe that these practices result in greater agency at the level of the subsidiary, nor do 
we think that the rhetoric of globalization, economies of scale and mutual benefits signals the 
advent of a more equitable or egalitarian MNC.  On the contrary, these are mere catchphrases 
that try to refract contemporary work processes through an ideological lens and contribute to the 
hegemony, albeit contested, of a specific kind of corporate discourse.  It is the responsibility of 
organizational scholarship to participate in the creation of counter-hegemonic discourses, to 
challenge sedimented wisdom and to subject the complacence of extant theorizations to critical 
scrutiny (Mir & Mir, 2002). 
 We will conclude by revisiting the vignette with which we opened this paper.  Bhavnani 
and Sons, the corporate contracting firm that displayed Chloron’s mission statement in its modest 
workshop is an important reflection of the rapid (albeit recent) incursion of global capital into 
India’s local economic landscape.  Just as Tendulkar’s recalcitrance serves as a metaphor for the 
limits of globalization, so too does the presence of the mission statement at Bhavnani represent 
the power and extent of global reach.  The physical presence of the mission statement of Chloron 
at Bhavnani and Sons (laminated in the United States, frayed at the edges, a bit grimier than its 
counterparts at Chloron-India’s well appointed Mumbai office) can be regarded as a benign, 
apolitical event.  However, we argue that it provides us an interesting insight into the materiality 
of the relational difference between entities that are at the different ends of a power relationship.  
In his famous essay Do Artifacts Have Politics, Langdon Winner (1986) discusses how the 
presence of low bridges on the parkways in Long Island (New York) provide an insight into class 
analysis (they had been built low so that buses could not run on them, and would thus keep to 
keep the pristine beaches of Long Island free of the presence of poor people).  Undocumented 
immigrants in the United States were more likely than others to display the flag of the United 
States at their homes in the wake of September 11, 2001 (Leong & Nakanishi, 2002).  
Ethnographies of infrastructure reveal how values get inscribed into artifacts. (Star, 1999).   
Artifacts whether they are mission statements, cluster bombs, computerized assembly lines, or 
PowerPoint presentations also have their own political stories to tell.   
 In the case we have analyzed, Bhavnani and Sons, despite their status as a contractor, 
wanted to emphasize their loyalty to Chloron, reflecting the tenuous nature of their foothold with 
the organization.  The artifact of the mission statement, present at it is in the Bhavnani office, 
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thus becomes a symbol of Chloron’s hegemony (after all, it is presumably placed there 
voluntarily).  It indicates the acceptance of the Chloron philosophy by Bhavnani, an alignment of 
interests within the power dynamic.  However, its curious juxtaposition with other artifacts of a 
highly local cadence (such as the pictures of Hindu deities) alongside the mission statement, its 
somewhat sorry condition (relative to the clean and well-framed displays at the air-conditioned 
offices of Chloron-India), and the occasional derisive comments it attracted from the workers of 
Bhavnani and Sons (usually around the time when the unit was being harried by Chloron-India’s 
demands) point to an interruption of the hegemony.  It is important to remember that these 
interruptions do not in any way reconfigure the power relationship between Chloron and 
Bhavnani, but rather point to the moment of rupture between the two entities, where the failure 
of hegemony has to be managed by the routines of dominance.  These routines included threats to 
invoke the fine print of contracts, withholding past (already delayed) payments till the 
completion of future work, dismissing suggestions and constantly reminding Bhavnani that there 
were other workshops that would be glad to do the same work for Chloron. 
  While many theorists have debated the phenomenon of knowledge transfer in the MNC, 
very few have addressed how these new imperatives of thought and action that constitute new 
knowledge are received in the terrain that constitutes the subsidiary of the MNC.  It is easy to 
theorize that new knowledge flows into a vacuum of ignorance, but the reality is that there 
already exist complex and imbedded processes of learning at the subsidiary level, which new 
knowledges seek to displace.  In this context therefore, we need a new research agenda  in the field 
of knowledge transfer.  Our new research questions may be articulated as follows: How are change 
demands communicated by headquarters of MNCs to subsidiaries?  How are they internalized at the 
subsidiary level?  How are they assimilated or resisted?  More importantly, how do local interests 
hybridize, transform, and indigenize these alien demands so as to carve out a space of “local” 
agency within the “globalized” economy?  And ultimately, what does this new story of knowledge 
transfer, of political economy, and the changing landscape of industrial accumulation have to offer 
to those researchers who try to write a different organizational theory, one that is sensitive to those 
subjects who are consigned to the periphery of mainstream organizing?  Research that attempts to 
offer answers to these questions will be of great importance, and will join a small but growing body 
of research that offers a different understanding of organizations and their activities. 
 
 29 
References 
 
Almeida, P. & Phene, A. (2004).  ‘Subsidiaries and knowledge creation: The influence of the 
MNC and host country innovation’.  Strategic Management Journal, 25, 847-864.  
Alvesson, M. & Kärreman, D. (2001).  ‘Odd couple: Making sense of the curious concept of 
knowledge management’. Journal of Management Studies, 38, 7, 996-1018. 
Banerjee, S.B. (2000).  ‘Whose land is it anyway?  National interest, indigenous stakeholders 
and colonial discourses:  The case of the Jabiluka uranium mine’.  Organization & 
Environment, 13, 1, 3-38.    
Barley, S. R. (1996).  ‘Technicians in the workplace: Ethnographic evidence for bringing work 
into organization studies’.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 41:404-441. 
Bate, S. (1997).  ‘Whatever happened to organizational anthropology?’  Human Relations, 50: 
1147-1175. 
Becker, M.C. (2001).  ‘Managing dispersed knowledge: Organizational problems, managerial 
strategies and their effectiveness.”  Journal of Management Studies, 38, 7, 1037-1051. 
Brown, J.S. & Duguid, P. (1998). ‘Organizing knowledge’.  California Management Review, 40, 
3, 90-111. 
Brown, J.S. & Duguid, P. (2001).  ‘Knowledge and organization: A social-practice perspective’.  
Organization Science, 12, 2, 198-213. 
Chandrasekhar, C.P. & Ghosh, J. (2002). The Market that Failed: A Decade of Neoliberal 
Economic Reforms in India. New Delhi: Leftword Books. 
Coff, R., Coff, D. & Eastvold, D. (2006). The knowledge-leveraging paradox: How to achieve 
scale without making knowledge imitable. Academy of Management Review, 31(2): 452-
465. 
Contu, A. & Willmott, H. (2003).  ‘Re-embedding situatedness: The importance of power 
relations in learning theory’. Organization Science, 14, 3, 283-296.    
Cooke, B (2003). ‘Managing organizational culture and imperialism.  In Prasad, A. (Ed.), 
Postcolonial theory and organizational analysis: A critical engagement.  New York: 
Palgrave, Macmillan, 75-94. 
Davenport, T. H. & Prusak, L. (1998). Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage what 
they Know. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 30 
Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (2005). Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Diplock, P. (1997). Organizational change schemas: An empirical investigation of how health 
care managers make sense of organizational change. Unpublished dissertation at the 
University of Massachusetts.  
Escobar, A. (1995).  Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World, 
1945-1992.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) Rationality and power: Democracy in practice. London: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977. (tr. 
C. Gordon). New York: Pantheon Books. 
Gadamer, H. (1975). Truth and method. London: Sheed and Ward. 
Geertz, C. (1973). Deep Play:  Notes on the Balinese Cockfight.  In Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures. (Pp. 412-453). New York:  Basic Books. 
Geertz, C. (2000).  Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Gordon, R. & Grant, D. (2005). Knowledge management or management of knowledge? Why 
people interested in knowledge management need to consider Foucault and the construct 
of power.  Tamara: Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science. 
Gottfried, H. (1994). ‘Learning the score: The duality of control and everyday resistance in the 
temporary-help service industry’. In Jermier, J. M., Knights, D. & Nord, W. (Eds.), 
Resistance and power in organizations, London: Routledge, 102-127. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and 
translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International 
Publishers. 
Guha, R. (1989). Dominance without hegemony and its historiography. In Guha, R. (Ed.) 
Subaltern Studies VI, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 210-309. 
Gupta, A. & Govindarajan, V. (1991). ‘Knowledge flows and the structure of control within 
multinational corporations’.  Academy of Management Review, 16, 4, 768-792.  
Harvey, D. (1996).  Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 
 31 
Hayek, F.A. (1945).  ‘The use of knowledge in society’.  American Economic Review, 35, 4, 
519-30. 
Hayek, F.A. (1988).  ‘The Fatal Conceit: The errors of socialism’.  In Bartley W.W. (Ed.). 
London: Routledge. 
Inkpen, A. & Pien, W. (2006).  An examination of collaboration and knowledge transfer: China-
Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park, Journal of Management Studies, 43, 4: 779-801. 
Kaviraj, S. (1992). The imaginary institution that was India.  In Guha, R. (Ed) Subaltern Studies: 
VII.  New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1-27. 
Keren, M. & Ofer, G. (2002). ‘The role of FDI in trade and financial services in transition: What 
distinguishes transition economies from developing economies’? Comparative Economic 
Studies, 44, 1, 15-45. 
 Kogut, B. & Zander, U. (1996). What firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning. 
Organization Science, 7(5): 502-518. 
Kondo, D. K. (1990). Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese 
Workplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kunda, G. (1992). Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation.  
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
Kwek, D. (2003).  ‘Decolonizing and re-presenting culture’s consequences: A postcolonial 
critique of cross-cultural studies in management’.  In Prasad, A. (Ed.), Postcolonial 
theory and organizational analysis: A critical engagement.  New York: Palgrave, 
Macmillan, 121-146. 
Leong, R. & Nakanishi, D. (2002).  ‘War and peace.  When past and future became the now’.  In 
Russell C. Leong and Don T. Nakanishi (Ed.) Asian Americans on War and Peace, (pp. vii-
 xii), Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Press. 
Levy, D. & Scully, M. (2006).  The institutional entrepreneur as Modern Prince: The strategic 
face of power in contested fields.  Working paper. 
Liebeskind, J. P. (1996). ‘Knowledge, strategy, and the theory of the firm’. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17 (Winter), 93-107. 
Lindkvist, L. (2005). Knowledge communities and knowledge collectivities: A typology of 
knowledge work in groups.  Journal of Management Studies, 42, 6: 1189-1204. 
Lukes, S. (2005).  Power: A radical view. 2nd edition.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 32 
Macaulay, T. B. (1972). T. B. Macaulay: Selected Writings. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Madison, D. S. (2005). Doing Critical Ethnography, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Martin, P. Y. & Turner, B.  (1986). Grounded theory and organizational research.  Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 22,141-157. 
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Mir, R. & Mir, A. (2002).  ‘The organizational imagination: From paradigm wars to praxis’. 
Organizational Research Methods, 5, 1, 105-125. 
Mir, R. (2001). Migrating Ideas: An Empirical Study of Intra-Organizational Knowledge 
Transfer. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Mir, R., Mir, A. & Upadhyaya, P. (2003). ‘Toward a postcolonial reading of organizational 
control.  In Prasad, A. (Ed.), Postcolonial theory and organizational analysis: A critical 
engagement.  New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 47-74. 
Nonaka, I. (1994). ‘A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation’. Organization 
Science, 5, 1, 14-37. 
Ong, A. (1987). Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Orlikowski, W.J. (1996).  ‘Improvising organizational transformation over time:  A situated 
change perspective’.  Information Systems Research, 7, 63-92. 
Porras, J.J. & Silvers, C. (1991).  ‘Organization development and transformation’.  Annual 
Review of Psychology, 42, 51-78. 
Prasad, A. & Prasad, P. (2003).  The empire of organizations and the organization of empires: 
Postcolonial considerations on theorizing workplace resistance.  In Prasad, A. (Ed.), 
Postcolonial theory and organizational analysis: A critical engagement.  New York: 
Palgrave, Macmillan, 95-120. 
Prasad, A. (2003).  Postcolonial Theory and Organizational Analysis. Reconstruction. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Prasad, P. (1992). Work Computerization as Symbol and Experience: An Inquiry into the 
Meanings of Technological Transformation. Unpublished dissertation at the University of 
Massachusetts.  
 33 
Prasad, P. (2005). Crafting Qualitative Research: Working in the Postpositivist Traditions. 
London: M. E. Sharpe. 
Rosen, M. (1991). From Text to Action. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Ryle, G. (1949).  The Concept of Mind.  London: Hutcheson.   
Schwartzmann, H. (1995). Ethnography in Organizations. London: Sage Publications. 
Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New  Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Shohat, E. (1992).  ‘Notes on the postcolonial’.  Social Text 31/32. 99-113. 
Star, S. L (1999). The ethnography of infrastructure, The American Behavioral Scientist, 43 (3): 
377-353. 
Sturdy, A, & Grey, C. (2003).  Beneath and beyond organizational change management: 
 Exploring alternatives.  Organization, 10, 4, 651-662. 
Thompson, P., Warhurst, C. & Callaghan, G. (2001).  ‘Ignorant theory and knowledgeable 
workers: Interrogating the connections between knowledge, skills and services.”  Journal 
of Management Studies, 38, 7, 924-42. 
Tsoukas, H. & Chia, R. (2002).  ‘On organizational becoming: Rethinking organizational 
change.  Organization Science, 13, 5, 567-582. 
Tsoukas, H. (1996).  ‘The firm as a distributed knowledge system: A constructionist approach’. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17, Winter Special Issue, 11-25. 
Van de Ven, A. & Poole, M (2002). ‘Field research methods,’ In J. Baum (Ed.) The Blackwell 
Companion to Organizations, pp. 867-888. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Van de Ven, A. & Poole, M.S. (1995).  ‘Explaining development and change in organizations’.  
Academy of Management Review, 20, 510-540. 
Van Maanen, J. (1988). Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Weick,  K.  E., & Westley, F. (1996).  ‘Organizational learning:  Affirming an oxymoron’. In S. 
R. Clegg, C. Hardy & W. R. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of Organization Studies (pp. 440-
458). London: Sage. 
Weick, K. & Quinn, R.E. (1999).  Organizational change and development.  Annual Review of 
Psychology, 50, 361-386. 
Williams, R. (1976).  Keywords.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 34 
Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and Literature. London: Oxford University Press. 
Winner, L. (1986). Do artifacts have politics? In J. Wacjman & D. Mackenzie (Eds.), The social 
shaping of technology: How the refrigerator got its hum (pp. 26-37). Milton Keynes, UK: 
Open University Press. 
 
About the authors 
Raza Mir is an Associate Professor in the College of Business at William  Paterson University.  
His research mainly concerns the transfer of  knowledge across national boundaries in MNCs, 
and issues relating to   power and resistance in organizations. He is the corresponding 
author,  and can be reached at mirr@wpunj.edu.     
 
Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee is Associate Dean of Research and Professor of Management in the 
College of Business at University of Western Sydney.  His research interests include 
sustainability, corporate social responsibility, and postcolonialism.  He has published widely in 
scholarly journals and his work has appeared in Journal of Marketing, Organization Studies, 
Journal of Management Studies, Organization, and Human Relations.   
 
Ali Mir is an Associate Professor in the College of Business at William  Paterson University. He 
is currently working on issues related to  migration/immigration and the international division of 
labor. He is on  the board of directors of the Brecht Forum in New York City. 
 
Figure 1 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: ISSUES INVOLVED IN KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
   
 
 
 
HOME 
COUNTRY 
 
HOST 
COUNTRY 
MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATION 
 Balancing global 
opportunities with 
economic and 
political risk   Perceptions of the 
“culture” of the 
host nation.  Bilateral relations 
 
 
 Perceptions of 
“foreign threat”  Perceptions of 
global promise  Historical power 
relations between 
home and host 
nation  Colonial legacies  Popular will 
 
 Protection of 
international 
brands  Maximizing 
revenue 
appropriation 
 
 Lobbying  Global 
integration  Avoiding loss 
of independence  Dialogue vs. 
coercion 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (e.g. WTO) 
 Equalizing tariffs  Reducing corporate tax  Securing international property rights  Local development  Makes it possible for IBM AS400s to return to 
India  Allows Chloron to have more control over 
Chloron-India 
Knowledge transfer 
from Springfield to 
Mumbai 
ENDNOTES 
                                                          
i
 All names and identifiers have been disguised for confidentiality. 
 
ii
 Springfield is the US headquarters of Chloron. 
 
iii
 These reasons related to a policy of import-substitution adopted by the Government of India in 
the 1970s, which led to the departure of companies like IBM from the country.  IBM’s AS400 
mainframes were the systems on which Chloron’s corporate ERP systems ran, and the absence of 
this key hardware led to the ERP being unavailable in Chloron-India. 
 
iv
 This refers to Akira Kurosawa’s classic 1950 film (http://imdb.com/title/tt0042876/), where an 
event is recounted several times from the point of view of different participants.  No official 
account emerges at the end, despite all narratives being characterized as “true” from the point of 
view of different protagonists. 
 
v
 http://www.m-w.com/ 
 
vi
 India’s most important Hindu holiday, the equivalent of Christmas in importance. 
 
